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SEXUALITY LAW REFORM AND THE 
LANGUAGE OF PROGRESS: WHAT LIES 
BEHIND STATEMENTS THAT EQUALITY 
FOR LESBIAN AND GAY PEOPLE IS 
INEVITABLE? 
KENT BLORE∗ 
Equality for lesbian and gay people is increasingly being treated as 
inevitable. This article questions this sense of inevitability by exploring 
three possible explanations: (1) a cynical explanation that the language of 
inevitability is being used as a rhetorical device, (2) a mechanical 
explanation that the impending equality is an effect of prior causes in time, 
and (3) a teleological explanation that history is progressing towards its 
purpose of achieving equality. The article concludes that invocations of 
inevitability do not stand up to theoretical scrutiny and explores what 
options are then open to equality activists. 
I INTRODUCTION 
There is a prevalent sense in Western societies that equality for lesbian and 
gay people is inevitable. This article seeks to problematise this sense of 
inevitability by exploring three tentative and intersecting explanations: (1) a 
cynical explanation that the language of inevitability is merely being used as a 
rhetorical device, (2) a mechanical explanation that the impending equality is 
simply an effect of prior causes in time, and (3) a teleological explanation that 
history is unfolding according to its purpose of obtaining equality for all. Each 
explanation will be given a theoretical leg to stand on which will then be 
interrogated. 
Though the author sympathises with the objectives of equality activists, the 
article concludes that invocations of inevitability do not stand up to theoretical 
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scrutiny. None of the explanations provide a basis for believing that equality 
is inevitable. Rather than being preordained, equality requires a constant and 
conscious struggle by political actors. Faced with this reality, the article 
explores what options are open to equality activists. They may become 
despondent without the promise of a better future, they may become even 
more cynical –– perhaps with some success –– or they may generate a wholly 
new kind of activism that does not rely on assumptions of progress. Only by 
taking the latter path can we uncover what lies behind statements of 
inevitability and what is not being said by a progressivist lesbian and gay 
activism. For example, those who invoke inevitability tend to overlook 
countertrends away from equality and the possibility that formal equality is 
reversible. 
At the time of writing, the Australian Capital Territory is defending the 
constitutional validity of its Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) in 
the High Court.1 The successful defence of this legislation or the introduction 
of equivalent legislation at the federal level would not render this article 
otiose. Not only would the achievement of marriage equality fail to mark the 
end of discriminatory laws –– there are a host of other changes that need to be 
made before the law can be said to be sexuality-blind2 –– but, crucially, the 
achievement of marriage equality would not mean that it had been inevitable 
all along, nor would it prove a related assumption that marriage equality 
would be enduring once enacted. Regardless of the state of the law at the time 
you read this article, you will only be able to see whether these assumptions 
are valid by delving into the logic behind the language of inevitability. Such 
analysis also contains important lessons for the future of lesbian and gay law 
reform activism and for any other push for equality which seeks to mobilise 
support through a narrative of inevitability.  
First, this article will establish that there is in fact a sense of inevitability. To 
do so it will focus on the context with which the author is most familiar — the 
Australian social milieu. However, as the question of equality for lesbian and 
gay people –– especially as it relates to marriage –– has become an 
internationalised debate, some forays beyond Australia will be necessary. 
                                                 
1 Transcript of Proceedings, Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCATrans 
299 (3 December 2013). 
2 To give three examples in but one Australian jurisdiction, see: Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) 
ss 208, 215 (unequal ages of consent for gay and heterosexual males); Adoption Act 2009 
(Qld) ss 76, 89(7)(b)(v)(A) (a lesbian or gay man may only adopt a child who has particular 
needs and only if single); Kent Blore, ‘The Homosexual Advance Defence and the Campaign 
to Abolish it in Queensland: The Activist’s Dilemma and the Politician’s Paradox’ (2012) 
12(2) QUT Law and Justice Journal 36 (the continued operation of the ‘homosexual advance 
defence’ in murder trials). 
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II THE LANGUAGE OF INEVITABILITY 
If you listen very carefully to the same-sex marriage debate you will notice 
the language of inevitability being deployed by the advocates for equality. 
Once you tune your ears to it, you will notice that among all their other 
arguments are laced various iterations of the bare assertion that at some point 
–– and sooner rather than later –– same-sex marriage will simply happen. 
These statements are both outwardly directed, to tell their opponents that 
resistance is futile, and inwardly directed, as an affirmation that their position 
is correct because the tide of history is flowing in their direction. 
Starting with the most obvious source of same-sex marriage discourse –– 
marriage equality lobby groups — a search for the word ‘inevitable’ on the 
Australian Marriage Equality website returns 54 hits, with only one instance 
not directly related to achieving equality.3 Some examples are the lobby 
group’s own propaganda. For example their ‘case for marriage equality’ page 
reads: 
Some day, same-sex couples in Australia will have the legal right to marry. 
That is inevitable. As with every major human rights advance, from the 
abolition of slavery to allowing women to vote, future generations will look 
back and wonder how anyone could have opposed such a basic human 
right.4 
However, most (29 out of the 54) are external links to newspaper articles and 
opinion pieces in the popular press. Many of them relate to politicians 
announcing their belief that reform is inevitable — for example, Vice-
President Joe Biden in the United States (‘US’)5 and Labor candidate Kieran 
McAnulty in New Zealand.6 In Australia, the list includes the Greens Senator, 
Sarah Hanson-Young,7 the Greens MP, Adam Bandt,8 and the Tasmanian 
                                                 
3 Australian Marriage Equality, Search Results for ‘Inevitable’ (11 March 2013) <http://www. 
australianmarriageequality.com/wp/?s=inevitable>. 
4 Australian Marriage Equality, The Case for Marriage Equality: A Summary (14 November 
2010) <http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/get-informed/the-quick-case-for-
marriage-equality/>. 
5 Stephanie Coontz, ‘Gay Marriage Isn’t Revolutionary. It’s Just the Next Step in Marriage’s 
Evolution’, The Washington Post (online), 7 January 2011 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604911.html>; ‘Biden Says Gay Marriage is 
“Inevitable” Next Step’, Herald Sun (online), 25 December 2010 <http://www.heraldsun.com. 
au/ipad/biden-says-gay-marriage-is-inevitable-next-step/story-fn6s850w-1225976061149>. 
6 Kieran McAnulty, ‘Where is Christian Compassion?’, Stuff.co.nz (26 September 2012) 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff-nation/7731559/Where-is-Christian-compassion>. 
7 Australian Marriage Equality, Senator Releases Ad Urging Julia & Tony: “Don’t Delay the 
Inevitable’ (17 June 2012) <http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/2012/06/17/ 
senator-releases-ad-urging-julia-tony-dont-delay-the-inevitable/>; ‘Gay Marriage Vote 
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Premier, Lara Giddings.9 The power of this language of inevitability is so 
pervasive that it ensnared even the former Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, who, 
although she opposed marriage equality ‘for our culture [and] for our 
heritage’,10 conceded that it is nonetheless inevitable.11 Many of the pages cite 
opinion polls which register the community’s sense of inevitability about 
marriage equality.12 The remainder generally consist of bold assertions of 
inevitability with little supporting evidence,13 no doubt because lobby groups 
and journalists are forced to reduce their message to sound bites but also 
because such a search cannot easily capture more nuanced arguments that 
tend to employ modal verbs expressing inevitability such as ‘will [happen]’, 
‘shall [occur]’, and ‘must [be achieved]’. The results do show, however, that 
                                                                                                                    
Should Be on Conscience, Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young Says’, The Australian 
(online), 6 July 2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/gay-marriage-
vote-should-be-on-conscience-greens-senator-sarah-hanson-young-says/story-fn3dxity-
1226089051549>. 
8 Australian Marriage Equality, Bandt: Same-Sex Marriage ‘Inevitable’ (6 September 2011) 
<http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/2011/09/06/bandt-same-sex-marriage-
inevitable/>. 
9 Australian Marriage Equality, Tasmanian Premier Says Marriage Equality ‘Inevitable’ (6 
October 2011) <http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/2011/10/06/tasmanian-
premier-says-marriage-equality-inevitable/>. 
10 Sarah Le Marquand, ‘Julia Lives Her Life with Gay Abandon’, The Daily Telegraph 
(online), 28 June 2011 <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/opinion/julia-lives-her-life-
with-gay-abandon/story-e6frezz0-1226082987170>. 
11 Rodney Croome, ‘Thirteen Marriage Equality Moments in 2012’, Gay News Network (21 
December 2012) <http://gaynewsnetwork.com.au/viewpoint/viewpoint/10086-thirteen-
marriage-equality-moments-in-2012.html>; Australian Marriage Equality, ‘PERFECT 
HOSTESS’: PM Opens Up on Gay Marriage (23 February 2012) <http://www.australian 
marriageequality.com/wp/perfect-hostess-pm-opens-up-on-gay-marriage/>; Jessica Wright, 
‘Gay Marriage “Inevitable”, Gillard Tells Guests’, Brisbane Times (online), 22 February 
2012 <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/political-news/gay-marriage-inevitable-
gillard-tells-guests-20120221-1tlun.html>. 
12 See, eg, Alex Greenwich, ‘Gay Marriage Will Go Nuclear for ALP’, Daily Telegraph 
(online), 30 November 2011 <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/opinion/gay-marriage-
will-go-nuclear-for-alp/story-e6frezz0-1226209549140>; Brian Greig, ‘Greig: Christian 
Lobby Plays the Victim Card’, Crikey (online), 16 August 2011 <http://www.crikey. 
com.au/2011/08/16/greig-christian-lobby-plays-the-victim-card/>; Australian Marriage 
Equality, 3 in 4 Australians Believe Same-Sex Marriage ‘Inevitable’ (8 June 2011) 
<http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/2011/06/08/3-in-4-australians-believe-same-
sex-marriage-inevitable-mum-asks-gillard-%e2%80%98not-to-delay%e2%80%99-in-new-tv-
campaign/>. 
13 See, eg, ABC, ‘Marriage Equality is Inevitable — Just Look at Its Critics’, The Drum, 17 
May 2012 (Tim Dunlop) <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4015156.html>; Gavin Marshall, 
‘Labor Must Do What Is Just And Back Same-Sex Marriage’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 16 November 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/labor-must-do-what-
is-just-and-back-samesex-marriage-20111115-1nh37.html>; ABC, ‘The Heart-Shaped 
Island’, The Drum, 23 September 2011 (Rodney Croome) <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/ 
2911966.html>. 
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even unsubtle arguments about inevitability are infiltrating the socio-political 
landscape in Australia. 
Another indication of the pervasiveness of this idea –– this time from popular 
culture –– is the 2012 hip-hop song ‘Same Love’ by Macklemore and Ryan 
Lewis from the US.14 As a measure of its popularity in Australia, it was voted 
15th in Triple J’s Hottest 100 for 201215 and then reached platinum sales 
figures and dominated the ARIA Charts at number one for four weeks in a 
row in early 2013.16 Although the lyrics reveal that it was written against the 
backdrop of the American debate about same-sex marriage –– ‘Till the day 
my uncles can be united by law’ –– it also tackles a number of other issues, 
including stereotypes about homosexuality, suicide ideation among lesbian 
and gay teens, and the derogatory use of ‘gay’ in the hip-hop genre and in 
online social media. If you analyse the choice of language more closely, two 
assumptions become apparent: first, that sexuality is immutable –– the chorus 
echoes the message of Lady Gaga’s 2011 song ‘Born This Way’17 with the 
lyrics, ‘I can’t change/ Even if I tried/ Even if I wanted to’ –– and second, that 
equality for lesbian and gay people is inevitable. Macklemore, the singer and 
author of the lyrics,18 frequently employs the preposition ‘until’ to imply an 
endpoint to discrimination, for example, ‘No freedom till we’re equal’. 
Elsewhere in the song he reveals the philosophical basis for this kind of 
language –– the idea that history is bettering itself as it moves forward: 
‘Progress, march on’. 
On a level of slightly more nuanced debate, a recent book entitled Speak Now 
conveniently compiles the perspectives of the most prominent commentators 
on same-sex marriage in Australia. It is replete with examples of the language 
of inevitability. For example, Peter Tatchell, who co-ordinates the Equal Love 
campaign in the United Kingdom (‘UK’), asserts, ‘[s]ame-sex marriage is an 
idea whose time has come. It is the growing trend all over the world’.19 This 
                                                 
14 Macklemore and Ryan Lewis featuring Mary Lambert, ‘Same Love’, The Heist, Macklemore 
LLC, 2012. 
15 ABC, ‘Hottest 100:15’, Triple J, 26 January 2013 <http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/hottest100/ 
12/countdown/15.htm>. 
16 Gavin Ryan, ‘Macklemore and Ryan Lewis Same Love Spends 4th Week at No 1’, Noise 11, 
10 February 2013 <http://www.noise11.com/news/macklemore-and-ryan-lewis-same-love-
spends-4th-week-at-no-1-20130210>. 
17 Lady Gaga, ‘Born This Way’, Born This Way, Streamline, Interscope and Kon Live, 2011. 
18 Jesse Mattheson, ‘Macklemore: Why I wrote Same Love’, Same Same (online), 23 January 
2013 <http://www.samesame.com.au/features/9365/Macklemore-Why-I-wrote-Same-Love. 
htm>. 
19 Peter Tatchell, ‘Dear Julia, the Public Supports Gay Marriage. Why Won’t You?’ in Victor 
Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 
2011) 222, 222. 
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identification of a trend towards equality for homosexuals was given a 
Hegelian overtone by Kerryn Phelps in a speech she delivered at the Sydney 
Mardi Gras in 2011 which was later republished in Speak Now. She said, 
‘[t]he Zeitgeist … is with us and we have the momentum to succeed’20 and 
‘[w]e stand on the threshold of change’.21 Alyena Mohummadally and 
Catherine Roberts implicitly locate this trajectory in the history of sexuality 
law reform to date when they say: 
The passage of the Relationships Act 2008 (Vic) and the subsequent 
introduction of the ‘relationships register’ in Victoria represented a 
significant –– although not ideal –– step forward in the slow race to 
equality.22 
Similarly, Monash University academics Adiva Sifris and Paula Gerber 
identify ‘a general trend towards tearing down discriminatory barriers 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples in all areas of the law’.23 Of 
course, the identification of trends may not necessarily equate to fatalism. 
Trends may be acknowledged without deducing from them that any particular 
result is inevitable. However, in these instances the authors not only identify 
patterns but also an endpoint –– lesbian and gay equality –– which they then 
appear to treat as a logical and certain conclusion.24 
Other contributors to Speak Now look beyond a trend towards lesbian and gay 
equality, and place the debate within the context of a broader movement 
through history towards equality for all. Rodney Croome, the campaign co-
ordinator of Australian Marriage Equality, links ‘today’s freedom to marry 
movement’ to ‘the movements before it’.25 Zenith Virago, a marriage 
celebrant, writes: 
                                                 
20 Kerryn Phelps, ‘Marriage Equality: No More Lame Excuses’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak 
Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 184, 189. 
21 Ibid 190. 
22 Alyena Mohummadally and Catherine Roberts, ‘When Worlds, Happily, Collide’ in Victor 
Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 
2011) 135, 137. 
23 Adiva Sifris and Paula Gerber, ‘It Makes No Sense: Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in 
Australia’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage 
(Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 211, 217. 
24 See, eg, ibid, where exclusion of same-sex couples from adoption is described as 
‘inconsistent and illogical’. If the inconsistency relates to a difference in approach between 
jurisdictions it does not follow that one approach is illogical and the other logical. 
Accordingly, the conclusion that it is not logical seems to be because it is not consistent with 
the trend towards an endpoint which is deemed logical. 
25 Rodney Croome, ‘A History of Freedom to Marry in Australia’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak 
Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 44, 46. 
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In the long and constant struggle for a more humane world which 
acknowledges equal rights for every human being, we are reminded of some 
other past and current causes, freedom of slaves in the US and elsewhere, 
equality between all races regardless of colour [sic] of their skin or religious 
views, women’s suffrage and the ongoing battle for respect and equality … 
It seems to many people that the campaign for homosexual rights, 
recognition and equality is the last fight in a long history of prejudice and 
domination.26 
Even focusing on the trend towards equality within the institution of marriage, 
Paul Martin points out that we now laugh at ‘those in the past who opposed 
mixed race marriages’27 and the Reverend Dorothy McRae-McMahon notes 
that the power balance between women and men within marriages has ‘shifted 
towards equality’.28 
Many of the contributors harbour reservations, chiefly centred around who 
will be excluded from the new equality, such as polyamorous queers who do 
not fit the monogamous model of heterosexual marriage.29 But even these 
reluctant converts are resigned to equality. Dennis Altman, who refuses to 
‘buy into the most conventional morality’ through marriage still states 
unblinkingly that ‘Australia will probably legalise same-sex marriage within 
the next decade’.30 Employing more fatalistic language, Wayne Morgan –– an 
academic from the Australian National University College of Law, with 
similar views on marriage –– writes: ‘Like many others, I see the recognition 
of same-sex marriage in Australia as inevitable. It is not a question of whether 
it will happen, the only question is when’.31 Crusader Hillis, a self-avowed 
marriage agnostic, looks beyond lesbian and gay equality to other equalities: 
‘I expect first to see equality under the law, and then for the law to take into 
account the many and varied complexities that modern relationships bring 
                                                 
26 Zenith Virago, ‘Conducting Commitment Ceremonies’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: 
Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 230, 232. 
27 Paul Martin, ‘Gathering the Pieces’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian 
Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 120, 120. 
28 Rev Dorothy McRae-McMahon, ‘Are You and Ali Married, Grandma?’ in Victor Marsh 
(ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 
116, 116. 
29 See, eg, Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli, ‘“Messing Up the Couples’ Cabinet”: On the “Queerly 
Mixed” Borders of the “Residual” and the “Emergent” in the Marriage Debates’ in Victor 
Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 
2011) 166; see also her fatalism at 180. 
30 Dennis Altman, ‘Why Gay Marriage?’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian 
Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 1, 1. 
31 Wayne Morgan, ‘A Brief History of Relationship Law Reform in Australia’ in Victor Marsh 
(ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 
143, 149. 
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with them.’32 Similarly, Damien Riggs from Flinders University asks what 
will happen after the inevitable: 
What will happen once this subsection [of white, middle class, 
monogamous homosexuality] achieves equality with their matched sample 
within the heterosexual community? Will we sit back and rest easy, or will 
we make sure that everyone else who experiences disenfranchisement is 
given their fair go, too?33 
Michael Kirby sees the potential for equality beyond only a queer agenda by 
suggesting that ‘then … we can turn our attention to other irrational hates and 
fears … on the way to full civil equality in a truly civilised society’.34 
This fatalistic language is perhaps most marked in the popular press and in 
regard to same-sex marriage, but it extends to academic journals and in regard 
to other topics of sexuality law reform. One example in Australia is the recent 
special edition of the journal Law in Context, devoted to the topic of the 
regulation of same-sex relationships. In the foreword, Michael Kirby provides 
a brief overview of human history that purports to reveal a ‘process’ toward 
recognising fundamental human rights,35 and then a similarly truncated 
version of gay history is given to show that ‘history is moving, and moving 
quickly’.36 At the outset of the introductory article, Paula Gerber and Adiva 
Sifris embrace a five-stage process to the evolution of lesbian and gay law 
reform which begins with criminalisation and ends in formal equality.37 They 
recount their own version of lesbian and gay history and, while noting 
setbacks to the march of progress and that not all parts of the globe are 
marching in unison,38 they conclude that ‘societies around the world are 
rapidly and irrevocably changing the way they look at same-sex relationships 
and families’ such that ‘there is reason to be optimistic’.39 Most of the 
remainder of the edition is similarly assured of an increasingly positive future 
for lesbian and gay people. For example, Adiva Sifris traces law reform trends 
                                                 
32 Crusader Hillis, ‘Thoughts of a Marriage Agnostic’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: 
Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 97, 98. 
33 Damien W Riggs, ‘The Racial Politics of Marriage Claims: Rights and Relationships in 
Colonial Contexts’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on Same-Sex 
Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 191, 192. 
34 Michael Kirby, ‘Foreword’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian Perspectives on 
Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) xix, xxv. 
35 Michael Kirby, ‘Foreword’ (2011) 28(1) Law in Context vii, viii. 
36 Ibid x. 
37 Paula Gerber and Adiva Sifris, ‘The Wind of Change is Blowing’ (2011) 28(1) Law in 
Context 1, 1. 
38 Ibid 2. 
39 Ibid 6. 
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in Australia to conclude that the legal recognition of lesbian parenting is 
imminent.40 To do this, she uses a sophisticated theory of causation to which 
we will return later in the article. Charlotte Frew’s article constructs a history 
of the evolution of the institution of marriage since Australia was colonised. 
She detects in that history a number of patterns, including the liberalisation of 
popular opinion,41 increasing support for marriage reform from within 
religious communities,42 and the success of previous libertarian causes.43 Her 
reading of these trajectories allows her to conclude, ‘If marriage continues to 
evolve according to this pattern, the legalisation of same-sex marriage is 
almost inevitable.’44 Jamie Gardner traces international rather than domestic 
patterns to likewise conclude that ‘the quest for same-sex marriage laws in 
Australia is no longer a dream but very much a reality’45 because the same 
impetuses that led to marriage equality elsewhere are also present here. 
This style of language also harks back at least to the nascence of the gay 
liberation movement. In the wake of the Stonewall Riots in 1969, Merle 
Miller outed himself in the New York Times in one of the first opinion pieces 
in defence of homosexuality. In it he wrote, ‘Laws discriminating against 
homosexuals will almost surely be changed. If not this year, in 1972; if not in 
1972, in 1976; if not in 1976 …’.46 Soon afterwards, in one of the seminal 
texts of gay liberation, Homosexual: Oppression and Liberation, Dennis 
Altman defined ‘gay liberation’ in terms of a trajectory towards an ultimate 
goal for civilisation: gay liberation ‘represents a process whereby 
homosexuals seek to come to terms with themselves and through self-
affirmation start out on the path toward human liberation’.47 Although he saw 
liberation as requiring a radical restructuring of society rather than the 
integration of homosexuals within existing norms, he was still fatalistic about 
the prospects of equality. He predicted –– using the certain ‘when’ rather than 
the conditional ‘if’ –– that:  
                                                 
40 Adiva Sifris, ‘Lesbian Parenting in Australia: Demosprudence and Legal Change’ (2011) 
28(1) Law in Context 8. 
41 Charlotte Frew, ‘The Social Construction of Marriage in Australia: Implications for Same-
Sex Unions’ (2011) 28(1) Law in Context 78, 80. 
42 Ibid 82. 
43 Ibid 83. 
44 Ibid 78. 
45 Jamie Gardiner, ‘Same-Sex Marriage: A Worldwide Trend?’ (2011) 28(1) Law in Context 
92, 103. 
46 Merle Miller, On Being Different: What It Means to Be a Homosexual (Penguin Books, first 
published 1971, 2012 ed) 23. See also his afterword at 39: ‘I am much more optimistic than 
when I wrote the piece, much; the laws, as I said, will be changed, sooner than I thought. 
Efforts are under way in every state, and they will, I think, succeed.’ 
47 Dennis Altman, Homosexual: Oppression and Liberation (University of Queensland Press, 
first published 1971, 2012 ed) 237. 
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[g]ay liberation will have achieved its full potential when it is no longer 
needed, when we see each other neither as men and women, gay and 
straight, but purely as people with varied possibilities.48 
Of course not all commentators are so optimistic, even leaving aside for a 
moment those who confidently believe that lesbian and gay rights are doomed 
to fail by religious design.49 There is, for example, a significant body of 
literature in the US which cautions against rights-based claims for lesbian and 
gay people because law reform can have unintended consequences, including 
regressive ones.50 This acknowledgement of regression runs counter to the 
narrative of progress that undergirds the language of inevitability. It may also 
be that a chronological review of language employed in lesbian and gay 
literature would reveal a dip in fatalism through the queer theory dominance 
of the 1990s and 2000s, given its disdain for the idea of progress, influenced 
as it is by postmodernism’s ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’.51 However, 
such a detailed and wide-ranging literature review is beyond the scope of this 
article. Moreover, the observation that much of the current debate around 
lesbian and gay equality is employing the language of inevitability suffices to 
spark the present discussion. 
III EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SENSE OF INEVITABILITY 
How then can this sense of inevitability be explained? The present writer has 
identified three mutually reinforcing explanations, all of which appear to be 
motivating statements to the effect that equality will be achieved for lesbian 
                                                 
48 Ibid 162. See also at 246. 
49 See, eg, Simon Mann, ‘The Case against Legalising Same-Sex Marriage’, The Age (online), 
15 July 2012 <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/the-case-against-legalising-
samesex-marriage-20120714-2236g.html> (re opinion of conservative campaigner Jim 
Wallace). Cf, eg, John Milbank, ‘Best of 2012: Gay Marriage and the Future of Human 
Sexuality’, ABC Religion and Ethics (4 January 2013) <http://www.abc.net.au/ 
religion/articles/2013/01/04/3664220.htm>: ‘the Church needs already to face the fact that it 
is quite likely to lose this debate, even if it should still try to win it’. 
50 See, eg, Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(University of Chicago Press, 1991) 339–429; Didi Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for 
Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality (University of Toronto Press, 1994) 145; Nicola Barker, 
‘Ambiguous Symbolisms: Recognising Customary Marriage and Same-Sex Marriage in 
South Africa’ (2011) 7(4) International Journal of Law in Context 447, 447, 453–5. For the 
feminist origins of this body of literature, see, eg, Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of 
Law (Routledge, 1989) 49; Renee Romkens, ‘Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended 
Consequences of Rights-Based Interventions to Support Battered Women’ (2001) 13(2) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 265. 
51 Jean-Francis Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi trans, University of Minnesota Press, 1984) xxiv [trans of: La 
condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir (first published 1979)]. 
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and gay people: a cynical explanation, a mechanical explanation, and a 
teleological explanation. In teasing out these three explanations, academics 
and activists are cited who epitomise each, though of course, in practice, few 
are likely to neatly adhere to this tripartite taxonomy. In a social and political 
struggle over rights, statements of inevitability are likely to have more than 
one explanation and the explanations ascribed to particular authors may be 
different from the one they intended or would intend if they turned their 
minds to this question. However, some reductionism is necessary for the sake 
of clarity. The article is seeking to adduce explanations for the sense of 
inevitability and not explanations for inevitability itself; hence, they are not 
held out as justified explanations. 
A Cynical Explanation: Rhetorical Device 
The first and most straightforward explanation is that law reform advocates 
are simply employing a rhetorical device. They are incanting a slogan over 
and over until it generates its own resonance. Like an affirmation, saying it 
aloud makes it more likely to come true.52 It is cynical in the sense that the 
veracity of the statement as to whether equality is in fact inexorable is 
irrelevant to the speaker. 
Not all statements about inevitability fall into this category, only those 
instances that may be characterised as enthymemes –– in either of the senses 
used by Aristotle, as reasoning from a premise that is only probably true53 or 
as a syllogism with an unstated premise.54 So for example, when Rodney 
Croome, the national convenor of Australian Marriage Equality, says, ‘[T]he 
Coalition … cannot afford to maintain its blanket opposition to this inevitable 
and popular reform’55 or Dr Kerryn Phelps says, ‘It’s still inevitable it’s just a 
                                                 
52 Karl Popper refers to this ‘influence of the prediction upon the predicted event’ in the social 
sciences as the ‘Oedipus effect’, alluding to the Ancient Greek myth in which the oracle’s 
prediction played a crucial role in Oedipus fulfilling it by murdering his father and marrying 
his mother: Karl R Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Harper Torchbooks, 3rd ed, 1961) 13. 
53 Aristotle, ‘Rhetoric’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Oxford Translation (W Rhys Roberts trans, Princeton University Press, 1984) vol 2, 2152, 
2157 (1357a 30). See generally at 2152–237 (Books I and II). 
54 Ibid 2157 (1357a 16); H W B Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed, 1916) 350–2. 
55 Australian Marriage Equality, Young Libs Back Gay Marriage Free Vote (2 February 2013) 
<http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/2013/02/02/young-liberals-conference-
supports-marriage-equality-conscience-vote-advocates-say-pressure-mounting-for-abbott-to-
allow-mps-to-vote-according-to-their-beliefs/>. 
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matter of time [sic]’,56 both are proceeding on the basis of an unstated 
premise. In Croome’s case, his coupling of inevitability with popularity 
suggests that his hidden logic may run along these lines: 
Same-sex marriage has overwhelming support in the electorate. 
Reforms with the overwhelming support of the electorate are very 
likely to succeed. 
Therefore the push for same-sex marriage is very likely to succeed. 
There is then only a very little hyperbole needed to jump from ‘very likely’ to 
‘inevitable’. Phelps’s reference to time may be a hint that the proposition 
underlying her argument of inevitability is that history is progressive. 
The point, though, is that we cannot be certain what the bases of statements 
like these are. As Aristotle pointed out, they are aimed at persuasion, not at 
demonstrating their validity.57 For Plato, this preoccupation with persuasion 
means that rhetoricians lose sight of what it is they are trying to persuade 
others of.58 Whether their position is logically defensible becomes 
unimportant. It suffices that their arguments are accepted as ‘true enough’59 in 
the same way that the Sophists treated knowledge as contingent and therefore 
strategic.60 
While Plato’s criticism of sloppy logic may be levelled against the lesbian and 
gay lobby groups and sympathetic public figures working in sound bites, 
                                                 
56 Peter Jean, ‘Phelps Hits Same-Sex Stand’, Canberra Times (online), 28 January 2013 
<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/phelps-hits-samesex-stand-20130127-2dfdb. 
html>. 
57 Aristotle, above n 53, 2153–4 (1355a 4). 
58 See, eg, Plato, ‘Gorgias’ in The Dialogues of Plato (B Jowett trans, Clarendon Press, 4th ed, 
1953) vol 2, 533, 550–1 (462b–462c), 553 (464c–465a); Plato, ‘Phaedrus’ in The Dialogues 
of Plato (B Jowett trans, Clarendon Press, 4th ed, 1953) vol 3, 133, 167–8 (260a–260d), 177–8 
(269b–269c). 
59 Aristotle, above n 53, 2154 (1355a 14): ‘For the true and the approximately true are 
apprehended by the same faculty’. Note though, that this was not a critical consideration for 
Aristotle who still considered that rhetoric was useful and unlikely to override the natural 
tendency of truth to prevail: 2154 (1355a 22). 
60 Ibid 2235 (1402a 24) (regarding the Sophist Protagoras’s claim that he could ‘mak[e] the 
worse argument seem the better’); Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed), The 
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (W D Ross trans, Princeton 
University Press, 1984) vol 2, 1552, 1653 (1047a 4), 1664 (1053a 35), 1678 (1062b 12); 
Jonathan Lavery, ‘Protagoras’ in Patricia O’Grady (ed), The Sophists: An Introduction 
(Duckworth, 2008) 30; Daniel Silvermintz, ‘The Double Arguments’ in Patricia O’Grady (ed), 
The Sophists: An Introduction (Duckworth, 2008) 147. 
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perhaps there is something more fundamental happening. Whether or not they 
consciously realise it, at least some fatalists are treating truth as something 
malleable rather than as something fixed and discoverable by reason. These 
fatalists are not overly concerned about the truth of their statements because 
they appreciate that what is accepted as truth is essentially a fiction; it is 
created. In the words of Michel Foucault, ‘the discovery of truth is in reality a 
certain modality of the production of truth’.61 What Foucault means by this is 
that types of knowledge –– and therefore what is accepted as true62 –– are 
strategically shaped and organised by exercises of power.63 The relationship 
between knowledge and power, however, is a two-way street; knowledge also 
reinforces the machinations of power. In fact, knowledge and power operate 
almost interchangeably.64 They are so mutually reinforcing that it can be 
difficult to see which is the product of the other. Statements about the 
inevitability of equality then are a type of discourse, which is a way of trying 
to constitute knowledge.65 Even though equality activists represent an 
extremely small and underfunded segment of society, it is clear from the way 
that even their opponents are forced to concede inevitability that they are 
dominating the discourse on inevitability. The fact that they have a virtual 
monopoly over this discourse reveals something about the knowledge–power 
(pouvoir/savoir) dynamic in the background. By deploying this discourse on 
inevitability they are heading down the path of formulating knowledge, and if 
they are able to do this it must be because they have usurped a great deal of 
their opponents’ power.66 This shift in power will only speed up because the 
knowledge formed in this way will in turn reinforce the authority of equality 
                                                 
61 Michel Foucault, Le pouvoir psychiatrique, Cours au Collège de France 1973–1974 
(Gallimard Seuil, 2003) 238, quoted and translated in Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault (Sage 
Publications, 2005) 93. 
62 Foucault is concerned only with contingent truths; the existence or non-existence of universal 
truths underneath these contingencies is largely irrelevant to him: Michel Foucault, ‘The 
Subject and Power’ in James D Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 
1954–1984 (Robert Hurley et al trans, The New Press, 2000) 326, 330; Michel Foucault, ‘The 
Concern for Truth’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live Interviews, 1961–1984 (Lysa 
Hochroth and John Johnston trans, Semiotext(e), 2nd ed, 1996) 455, 456. See similarly the 
views of Friedrich Nietzsche: Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction (Stanford 
University Press, 2001) 135–6. 
63 O’Farrell, above n 61, 87. 
64 See Foucault’s references to the composite term ‘knowledge–power’ in Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan trans, Vintage Books, 1995) 
27–8 [trans of: Surveiller et punir (first published 1975)]; Michel Foucault, The Will to 
Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (Robert Hurley trans, Penguin Books, 1998) 
143 [trans of: La volonté de savoir (first published 1976)]. 
65 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 
1997) 105.  
66 See Blore, above n 2, 58–64. 
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advocates. In sum, they are ‘build[ing] discourses not in order to arrive at 
truth, but to win’.67 
It may seem radical to say that these fatalists are aware — even 
subconsciously or unconsciously –– that they are deploying rhetoric in order 
to engineer truth. However, there are a few candid moments that reveal insight 
into just this from at least some fatalists. Thus, Evan Wolfson, a law reform 
activist in the United States, says that when he began agitating for marriage 
equality, ‘[o]ne of the very first tasks I set myself was to make people believe 
we could and would win, that triumph was inevitable’.68 It might be said that 
he was trying to fashion belief rather than truth, but if we are dealing in 
contingent truths then the difference is only one of degree. It is also clear that 
fatalists have identified the same tactic behind the counter-rhetoric of their 
opponents. In mid-2012, in the lead-up to a parliamentary vote on same-sex 
marriage, the right faction of the Australian Labor Party used rhetoric to the 
effect that marriage equality was doomed to fail. Faced with their own 
inevitability rhetoric being used against them, Australian Marriage Equality 
responded by issuing a media release, in which it quoted its national convener, 
Alex Greenwich, as saying that ‘“myth-making” about the inevitable failure 
of marriage equality is just another ploy by those opposed to reform who are 
trying to create a “self-fulfilling prophecy”’.69 When advocates for equality 
speak of inevitability in enthymematic terms, it is difficult for them to resist 
the same charges of creating self-fulfilling prophecies and myth-making (or 
more to the point, truth-making). Of course, truth-making is happening even 
when reasons are given for inevitability because the struggle for domination 
and power at the root of truth is still playing out, but the dynamic is most 
obvious when the truth–claim about inevitability is supported by nothing more 
than assertion. 
B Mechanical Explanation: Cause and Effect 
Most declarations of inevitability cannot be explained away so cynically, 
because more often than not a reason is provided or one can be inferred from 
the context. Some of these reasons are based on the idea of causation — that 
                                                 
67 Michel Foucault, ‘La vérité et les formes juridiques’ in Daniel Defert, François Ewald and 
Jacques Lagrange (eds), Dits et écrits: 1954–1988 (Gallimard, 1994) vol 2, 538, 632, quoted 
and translated in O’Farrell, above n 61, 66. 
68 Evan Wolfson, ‘Is the Freedom to Marry Inevitable?’ (Martin Luther King Jr Keynote 
address at University of Michigan Law School, 17 January 2011) <http://freemarry.3cdn.net/ 
02b8d3a283f544cec6_txm6bns9g.pdf>. 
69 Australian Marriage Equality, Marriage Equality Support Set to Increase/Labor Right 
Betrays Own Grass Roots (19 June 2012) <http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/ 
2012/06/19/marriage-equality-support-set-to-increase-labor-right-betrays-own-grass-roots/>. 
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the achievement of equality some time in the future will be the effect of 
certain causes we can detect now.70 From the review of Speak Now and the 
articles linked to the Australian Marriage Equality website, it appears that one 
of the most common causation-based explanations for why people think 
equality is inevitable is that they have adduced as much from reading opinion 
polls. For instance, Tim Wilson’s chapter in Speak Now draws a clear link 
between the growing sense of inevitability and an analysis of opinion polls. 
After repeating the oft-quoted statistic that roughly two-thirds of all 
Australians are in favour of legalising same-sex marriage, he looks at the 
generational dynamic to emphasise that the trend is set to continue: 
Polling focusing on the attitudes of young Australians delivers support 
levels around the 74 per cent mark. Unsurprisingly, faced with this reality, 
three-quarters of all Australians also now see marriage being extended to 
same-sex couples as inevitable.71 
That is, existing higher levels of support among younger people will cause 
higher levels of overall community support in the future, which in turn will 
cause the eventual recognition of equality by the law. The causal nexus 
between each step is far from airtight — people may change their stance as 
they age and majority support does not guarantee that the law will be changed 
— but the gap between those who support marriage equality and those who 
think it is inevitable shows that even opponents to change feel powerless to 
stop this chain of causation or one like it. 
If one accepts that equality is in the process of being caused, then positive 
opinion polls are likely to be mere symptoms of the deeper shifts in societal 
mores that are actually catalysing change. Intricate theories of causation try to 
explain these deeper dynamics at play. An example of such a theory is 
‘demosprudence’, developed by American legal scholars Gerald Torres72 and 
Lani Guinier,73 and adapted to the Australian context by Adiva Sifris in order 
to explore the impetuses for law reform with respect to lesbian parenting.74 
                                                 
70 Aristotle, above n 60, ‘Metaphysics’, 1600 (s 1013a 29): ‘[T]he maker [is the] cause of the 
thing made and the change-producing of the change’.  
71 Tim Wilson, ‘Respecting Diversity and Rights’ in Victor Marsh (ed), Speak Now: Australian 
Perspectives on Same-Sex Marriage (Clouds of Magellan, 2011) 237, 238 (emphasis in 
original). 
72 See Gerald Torres, ‘Some Observations on the Role of the Social Change on the Courts’ 
(2006) 54 Drake Law Review 895; Gerald Torres, ‘Legal Change’ (2007) 55 Cleveland State 
Law Review 135. 
73 See Lani Guinier, ‘Demosprudence through Dissent’ (2008) 122 Harvard Law Review 6; 
Lani Guinier, ‘Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide’ (2009) 89 
Boston University Law Review 539. 
74 Sifris, above n 40. 
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Demosprudence is a way of analysing the dynamics of legal change by 
focusing upon ‘the relationship between social movements and legal change 
and the obverse relationship between legal change and social movements’.75 
As Sifris sums up the idea of demosprudence: 
It is suggested that a circular process evolves, with the precursor to cultural 
and legal change arising from a subtle movement on the demographic 
landscape. This process is reinforced with either amendments to the law or 
other demosprudential forces. Inevitably, there is a change in societal 
attitudes which results in further legal and demographic movement. In 
reality these elements work in tandem. Social change pulls, the law and the 
law pushes society [sic].76 
The central claim of demosprudence is that the twin forces of legal change 
and social movement are mutually reinforcing. The law cannot change 
without a shift in culture,77 but equally a shift in culture can be brought about 
by a change to the law. This is because society simultaneously creates and 
follows norms. This may seem paradoxical at the macro level of change. For 
example, decriminalisation of homosexuality could not have occurred until 
societal attitudes about homosexuality changed, but societal attitudes could 
not have changed until homosexuality was decriminalised. However, 
demosprudence holds that there is no such contradiction on a micro level 
because each incremental shift is so subtle. Each miniscule shift in culture 
sparks a shift in rules which in turn sparks a further shift in culture, over and 
over again in a recursive cycle until we see substantive transformations such 
as the decriminalisation of homosexuality or majority support for same-sex 
marriage.  
Turning to the macro level of change, Kees Waaldijk’s ‘standard sequence’ 
theory and William Eskridge’s ‘step-by-step’ theory both posit that certain 
common markers of macro-change can be pinpointed along a chain of micro-
causation towards equality for lesbian and gay people. That is, we may not be 
able to see all of the causal steps, but there are a few landmark stages that we 
are able to observe, such that we can use them to measure and analyse change. 
Waaldijk first articulated his hypothesis of a ‘standard sequence’ towards 
equality for lesbian and gay people in an article in 1994.78 He sought to 
                                                 
75 Torres (2006), above n 72, 895. 
76 Sifris, above n 40, 22–3. 
77 See Thomas B Stoddard, ‘Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social 
Change’ (1997) 72 New York University Law Review 967, 977–8. 
78 Kees Waaldijk, ‘Standard Sequences in the Legal Recognition of Homosexuality — Europe’s 
Past, Present and Future’ (1994) 4 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 50. For a 
recent global version of this theory, see Kees Waaldijk, ‘Legal Recognition of Homosexual 
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discern a pattern from the chaos of data he had collected of the myriad ways 
in which European jurisdictions discriminated against and protected 
homosexuals. Looking at the information comparatively and over a period of 
time, Waaldijk came to the conclusion that 
[t]here seems to be a general trend of progress; where there is legal change 
it is change for the better. Countries are not all moving at the same time and 
certainly not at the same speed, but they are moving in the same direction 
— forward.79 
More than just that, Waaldijk identified a common way of moving forward: 
The law in most countries seems to be moving on a line starting at (0) total 
ban on homo-sex, then going through the process of (1) the 
decriminalisation of sex between adults, followed by (2) the equalisation of 
ages of consent, (3) the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation, and 
(4) the introduction of legal partnership. A fifth point on the line might be 
the legal recognition of homosexual parenthood.80 
This is the same five-stage model recently embraced in the introductory 
article of the Law in Context special edition.81 However, there is an important 
limit to the model — one that Waaldijk himself acknowledged. He noted that 
not all countries follow the ‘general (and logical) order of steps’;82 indeed, 
‘[o]ccasionally, a country takes a step backwards’.83 However, he stopped 
short of interrogating these anomalies. Moreover, Waaldijk never explicitly 
postulated what the logic of the ‘standard sequence’ is, save that it is not 
‘some “law of nature” prescribing the same specific sequences of steps in all 
countries (of Europe)’.84  
                                                                                                                    
Orientation in the Countries of the World: A Chronological Overview with Footnotes’ (Paper 
presented at The Global Arc of Justice — Sexual Orientation Law around the World, Los 
Angeles, 11–14 March 2009). For a specific example of the model, see Kees Waaldijk, ‘Small 
Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands’ in Robert 
Wintemute and Mads Andenaes (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study 
of National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2001) 437. See also Jenni 
Millbank, ‘Which, Then, Would Be the “Husband” and Which the “Wife”?: Some 
Introductory Thoughts on Contesting “the Family” in Court’ (1996) 3(3) Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 1. 
79 Waaldijk (1994), above n 78, 51. 
80 Ibid 51–2. 
81 Gerber and Sifris, above n 37. 
82 Waaldijk (1994), above n 78, 52. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid 64. 
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William Eskridge has extended Waaldijk’s theory in order to delve into this 
logic of progress. Eskridge’s reading of history begins with urbanisation.85 As 
populations grow and cities emerge from towns, minorities — including 
sexual minorities — become sufficiently concentrated for subcultures to 
flourish. Urban life also discourages large families, which frees up time for 
women to pursue roles outside of child-rearing, thereby undermining 
traditional gender roles. As population growth declines, sex is also defined 
less as procreative and more as pleasurable. Once a population is sufficiently 
urbanised, the stage is then set for the pattern of legal change identified by 
Waaldijk and which Eskridge calls ‘a step-by-step process’.86 According to 
Eskridge, ‘[s]uch a process is sequential and incremental: it proceeds by little 
steps that are taken in a particular order’.87 First, the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality acclimatises the wider public to the existence of lesbian and 
gay people and empowers more to come out of the closet. As anti-gay 
mindsets adjust and increasing numbers of lesbian and gay people demand 
rights, the public becomes increasingly likely to acquiesce to anti-
discrimination laws. The further normalisation of homosexuality pushes 
public opinion and lawmakers to pragmatically recognise the existence of 
same-sex relationships and then perhaps to symbolically recognise their equal 
validity by permitting same-sex marriage. 
In predicting equality for lesbian and gay people, all of these theories are 
based on the extrapolation of perceived trends. Sifris claims that micro-
changes in social, political and economic factors ‘have converged to create the 
momentum for ... the social and legal recognition of the lesbian-led family’.88 
Eskridge has similarly added micro-changes as flesh to the skeleton provided 
by Waaldijk to claim that marriage equality is nigh in most Western nations. 
No doubt, current events will have some impact upon future events. For 
example, given that older people tend to oppose same-sex marriage, as they 
die, average levels of support for marriage equality will very probably 
increase, at least in the near future. However, these theorists are reaching even 
further than the imminent future into the inherently uncertain realm of the 
more distant future. The further into the future they attempt to foresee, the 
murkier the image becomes because the possibility of random disruptions to 
causal connections becomes more and more likely.89 Further, the existing 
                                                 
85 William Eskridge, ‘Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step 
Approach toward State Recognition’ (2000) 31 McGeorge Law Review 641, 655–6. 
86 Ibid 647. 
87 Ibid 647–8. 
88 Sifris, above n 40, 23. 
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trends informing their conclusions of equality are so broad90 and so 
microscopic91 that no direct causal claims can be made,92 suggesting that 
authors such as Waaldijk and Eskridge have conveniently imposed order on 
the past through hindsight rather than discovered an inevitable chain of 
causation. Seen in this light, the conclusion of inevitability may in fact be the 
cumulation of a series of microscopic leaps of faith rather than microscopic 
causal connections.93 It is all the more suspicious that these leaps of faith lead 
to a convenient endpoint: equality. This is not to say that the inability to show 
direct causation is proof that there is no causation whatsoever — there is 
every chance that something indirect is going on — but it might also be that 
Sifris, Waaldijk and Eskeridge started with a teleological conclusion and 
worked backwards to a theory of causation 
Two further features of these theories hint at a teleological streak. The first is 
that there is little or no room in each of these models for backward steps. As 
Eskridge acknowledged of his step-by-step theory, ‘each step in the process is 
a step toward formal equality’94 and ‘[a] skeptic can reasonably object that 
this is the sort of progressive, whiggish approach to history that has repeatedly 
been undone by the unpredictability of human events’.95 Waaldijk, for his 
part, dealt with the difficulty of reconciling instances of regression by 
ignoring them completely.96 Demosprudence, on the other hand, has dealt 
with countertrends away from equality with somewhat more sophistication. 
The existence of countertrends and backlashes are readily acknowledged as 
long as they provoke an even greater swing back towards equality — what 
Torres terms a ‘blessing in disguise’97 and Guinier the ‘zigzag trajectory of 
change’.98 Thus the 15-year period of constant defeat suffered by campaigners 
for anti-discrimination laws in New York was in fact positive because it 
allowed the acceptance of homosexuality to be acculturated in advance of the 
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law.99 In the same vein, in Australia, ‘the negative publicity resulting from the 
former Howard government’s reluctance to legislate in respect of same-sex 
families stimulated the public’s interest’, thereby allowing legislative gains to 
be made down the track.100 Even for demosprudence, there are no permanent 
backward steps. 
The second feature of these theories that belies their true teleological 
inspiration is that they have an endpoint. For Sifris it is the full recognition of 
lesbian-led families. For Waaldijk and Eskridge, the trajectory that they see as 
inevitable (at least in parts of the West) appears to end abruptly in marriage 
equality. As one critic put it, the suggestion is ‘that to prevail on same-sex 
marriage is to prevail finally’.101 We are left to infer that the dynamics behind 
the inertia towards equality will suddenly become static once equality is 
achieved. In all of these theories there is no imagining of a post-equal world. 
As to why this might be, we turn to the third and final explanation for these 
statements of inevitability: a blind belief in the idea of progress. 
C Teleological Explanation: Equality as the Purpose of 
History 
It seems that G W F Hegel is on the tip of these theorists’ tongues. Hegel’s 
ideas may be almost 200 years old, but they seem to be well and truly alive in 
the assumptions imbuing many of the statements of inevitability uncovered in 
the first part of this article. Indeed, we saw Kerryn Phelps invoking the 
Hegelian notion of the Zeitgeist at the Sydney Mardi Gras.102 In fact, most 
statements of inevitability involve a subtle teleological component, in that 
they involve explanations of phenomena by reference to a purpose.103 This is 
most evident when progress is treated as a law of history rather than the 
chance effect of a constellation of causes. Even causal reasoning which starts 
with existing trends and ends in equality is likely unscientific; except for 
cautiously phrased predictions of the very near future, this reasoning is a 
bridge too far for logic. This kind of reasoning must begin with the conclusion 
of equality and work backwards to selecting facts that confirm the belief.104 
This is teleology par excellence –– starting with the purpose of history and 
then coming up with laws of history, such as progress, to get us there. Given 
Hegel’s reach beyond the grave, while he is notoriously difficult to pin down, 
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his ideas about history are useful in explaining this popular sense of 
inevitability. At the root of his philosophy is the same belief in historical 
development as something inevitable and progressive.105 
Fundamental to Hegel’s thesis of universal history is the principle that ‘[t]he 
History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of 
Freedom’.106 To understand what Hegel meant by this we need to begin with 
his assertion that history is rational. He wrote that ‘Reason is the Sovereign of 
the World [and] that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a 
rational process’.107 If history is rational then it cannot happen by chance in a 
series of random events; it must play out pursuant to certain laws. According 
to Hegel, some of these laws are mechanical, explaining events by pointing to 
prior causes in time (the notion of causation that we have already explored), 
and others are teleological, accounting for events by their underlying purpose 
or design.108 Thus to say there is reason in history is to say that events happen 
of necessity to realise a purpose.109 As to what this purpose is, Hegel pointed 
to the inherent form or essence of humankind which, he posited, is 
freedom.110 When he said that humans are by their nature free, he did not 
mean that we are born free,111 or that we are free in some state of nature.112 
Freedom is not a gift bestowed on us, but rather our goal that we must strive 
to achieve.113 Since realisation of this goal involves a process, it can only be 
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attained through the passage of time, that is, in history.114 It did not matter to 
Hegel that the individuals who act out history are unaware of this purpose of 
realising freedom. Hegel used the idea of the ‘cunning of reason’ (List der 
Vernunft) –– much like Adam Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’115 –– to 
contend that reason uses people’s self-interests to realise its own ends.116 Thus 
freedom is being actualised by the unwitting actions of individuals in the 
relentless march of history. But not only is freedom being actualised; it is also 
coming to an awareness of itself in the process.117 The regimes of knowledge 
being formed through the historical process118 are arriving at the insight that 
‘man, as such, is free’.119 According to Frederick Beiser, this self-awareness 
of freedom also embodies the idea of equality: 
Hegel argues that my self-awareness as a free being must be social or 
intersubjective. It demands the recognition of others as equal and 
independent beings because only by this means do I achieve the recognition 
necessary to confirm to myself that I too am an independent being.120 
In Hegel’s words, self-awareness of freedom is the ‘“I” that is “We” and 
“We” that is “I”’.121 Thus, the end of history is the realisation of a state in 
which there is a community between free and equal individuals.122 The 
struggle of lesbian and gay liberation –– to be treated as equal and 
independent beings –– is but one subplot along this path towards freedom. 
Before trying to cross-examine Hegel, it is necessary to lay out his mechanics 
of progress, for it is here that his theory becomes undisprovable.123 Hegel 
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argued that a dialectical relationship governs the evolution of freedom.124 
First, you have a thesis –– for example, in 2003 the Family Court of Australia 
recognised the validity of the marriage between a woman and a transsexual 
male, thereby throwing open the idea that marriage need not be defined by 
gender or sexuality.125 But as a thesis loses its original traction in society it 
sows the seeds of its own destruction. In this way it negates itself in the form 
of an antithesis or differentiation. In this example, the Howard government 
amended the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) to redefine marriage as exclusively 
heterosexual,126 and successive politicians reinforced this position. 
Destruction, suffering and evil are necessary in this view for otherwise we 
could not have regeneration.127 For Hegel, regressive steps represent freedom 
alienating itself –– a kind of metaphysical inner-division of the guiding spirit 
of history –– but he saw this as a necessary precondition for re-incorporating 
the other into itself again or self-realisation which is the purpose of history.128 
Thus, to continue with the above example, civil partnership regimes that have 
arisen in some Australian states and territories reconcile the need to 
acknowledge relationships with the privileging of marriage as a heterosexual 
institution. This unity-in-difference or synthesis then gives rise to its own 
antithesis –– perhaps a renewed push for marriage equality as has recently 
succeeded in the UK.129 This cycle of thesis, antithesis and then synthesis 
continues, but in a self-transcendent way so that freedom is constantly 
engaged in an ‘ascent to an ever higher concept of itself’.130 
It seems that the easiest way to discredit a theory of progress towards equality 
is to point to countertrends away from that endpoint. There are many 
examples of such regression that activists for equality have failed to weave 
into their statements of inevitability. For example, in 2012 the Queensland 
government established a precedent of reversing symbolic equality gains 
when it abolished state-sanctioned civil unions, leaving only the bare 
entitlement to register a relationship.131 In the process, the Queensland 
                                                                                                                    
reasonably well’: Michael Forster, ‘Hegel’s Dialectical Method’ in Frederick C Beiser (ed), 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 130, 131. 
124 Beiser, above n 105, 114–5; Hegel, above n 106, 56–7. 
125 A-G (Cth) v Kevin (2003) 172 FLR 300. 
126 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5 (definition of ‘marriage’), amended by Marriage Amendment 
Act 2004 (Cth) s 1. 
127 Hegel, above n 106, 26–7 (‘Periods of happiness are blank pages in [history], for they are 
periods of harmony — periods when the antithesis is in abeyance’), 72–3.  
128 Hegel, above n 106, 26, 55, 78. 
129 See Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (UK) c 30. 
130 Jeffrey A Gauthier, Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism (State University of New York 
Press, 1997) 166 (quoting a translation of a different edition of Hegel, above n 106). 
131 The Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld) became the Relationships Act 2011 (Qld) with the 
passing of the Civil Partnerships and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Qld). For the 
414 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 2 
Attorney-General threatened to also repeal ‘the provisions in the Surrogacy 
Act that deal with same-sex couples’.132 However, Queensland is far from the 
only jurisdiction to prove that devolution is possible. Victoria tinkered with its 
anti-discrimination legislation in 2011 in order to enlarge the areas of activity 
in which lesbian and gay people may legitimately be discriminated against.133 
Internationally, several American states have reversed marriage equality gains 
at the ballot box, most infamously by means of Proposition 8 in California 
(although that particular example was ultimately unsuccessful).134 In spite of 
Russia decriminalising homosexuality in 1993,135 in recent years nine regions 
enacted anti-proselytisation laws under which lesbian and gay people have 
been arrested for such trivial acts as holding a sign reading ‘Homosexuality is 
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Normal’,136 and in 2013 these laws were nationalised.137 Uganda is notorious 
for its draconian efforts to increase penalties for homosexuality,138 which, if 
successful, would signify a regression before there has been any progress 
from which to regress. However, the beauty of Hegel’s historicism is that all 
of these worrying trends are not only consistent with the idea of progress, they 
are prerequisites for progress. They are the ‘blessings in disguise’ marking the 
‘zigzag trajectory’ of the development of equality. No matter how oppressive 
the countertrends may be, Hegelians will reply that in the fullness of time an 
even greater equality will arise from the ashes of inequality. One cannot 
definitively say that the future will not eventually evolve in this way and so 
the assumption that history is progressive ‘can never finally be refuted’.139 
Irrefutability is not the end of the matter, however. When it comes down to a 
matter of belief, as it does here, one may still be able to say whether one 
proposition is more or less likely than some other proposition. At this point it 
is necessary to reintroduce Foucault who also dealt with regression in history, 
but who came to a radically different conclusion to Hegel. Foucault was 
mentioned above for his contention that truth is discursively constructed. 
What was not said is that he had a penchant for using history to prove this.140 
For instance, he famously debunked the immutability of sexuality by showing 
that it has a history; that ‘the homosexual’ did not register in our lexicon of 
ideas in the distant past and therefore is not an innate category of person.141 
Thus in order to lay bare the limits of entire systems of thought, Foucault 
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emphasised the ruptures, discontinuities and ceaseless change that 
characterise history. 
Foucault drew two lessons from these aspects of history. The first is to be 
wary of narratives of continuity. For him, ‘[t]he traditional devices for 
constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a 
patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled’.142 
Assumptions of continuity need to be challenged in Foucault’s view because 
they tend to downplay and erase instances of discontinuity, and if this is 
happening then history is being rewritten to fit a particular preconceived 
image of it. Certainly, in the discourse of inevitability, we have seen the 
sidelining of countertrends away from equality. It is difficult to find examples 
from popular culture of a statement of inevitability which simultaneously 
acknowledges regression.143 Even academic commentators such as Waaldijk 
and Eskridge –– though they have conceded that there are backward steps ––
have essentially ignored them as irrelevant to their theories of progress. It 
might be said that Hegel’s historicism escapes this criticism because he in fact 
embraces discontinuities as the preconditions for further progress –– they are 
the antitheses or blessings in disguise. But for Foucault, subsuming 
discontinuity within a broader prediction of continuity is nothing more than a 
sleight of hand. This is because doing so relies on a whole host of 
metaphysical beliefs which cannot be verified by experience, not least of 
which is a belief that regression cannot continue144 even though hypothetically 
we know it might. 
The second lesson that Foucault takes from discontinuity is that the future is 
unpredictable. On Clare O’Farrell’s reading of Foucault, he 
argues that we can only examine a system of discourse, an archive, once it 
has already happened. We cannot extrapolate from one specific historical 
order and say that a particular rule will be valid tomorrow or next year. One 
can only describe the rules of a past system of discourse, we cannot make 
those rules prescriptive and apply them in the future.145 
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It is perhaps too much to say that one can never extrapolate into the future,146 
but of present interest is Foucault’s reason for refusing to delve into the 
future. For him, the future cannot be divined because, as much as there might 
be cause and effect in history, there is also chance.147 Allowing for random 
events is pivotal because it strikes at the assertion that history is rational. If we 
accept that history might be irrational then all of Hegel’s teleology built upon 
that bedrock assertion148 comes tumbling down. One cannot hold 
simultaneously that all things happen for a reason but that some things might 
happen for no good reason at all. 
In the end, there is a choice between believing that history is rational and 
believing that it is irrational, neither of which can be definitively proved or 
disproved. In trying to decide which is more likely to be the case, it is 
important to point out that the history-as-irrational thesis has less to prove. On 
this view, history simply happens and we passively experience historical 
phenomena as isolated events without the need for positive beliefs to make 
sense of them. We have only the absence of belief. On the other hand, a 
rationalist view of history does require us to positively believe certain things, 
for example that everything has a purpose and that things will get better. In 
this sense progressivists bear the onus of showing why we should actively 
believe anything at all, let alone what they believe. Believing in the absence 
of something is still a belief and therefore one must ultimately be agnostic 
about history, but even so, it is more likely than not that we would be making 
things up if we were to believe that history plays out according to magical 
formulae. It follows that equality for lesbian and gay people probably is not 
inevitable, at least in a teleological sense, though no one can say for certain. 
As to why lesbian and gay law reform advocates nonetheless subscribe to 
inevitability, Immanuel Kant pointed out as long ago as the 18th century that 
human reason is tortured by questions it can neither answer nor ignore.149 
When we face questions that we cannot solve by reference to experience, ‘we 
would rather venture everything, even at the risk of erring, than give up’.150 
Nowadays evolutionary psychologists likewise argue that humans are 
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hardwired to try to make sense of anything they encounter.151 The hypothesis 
is that inferential reasoning gave our distant ancestors the competitive edge in 
the contest for survival, but a by-product of this characteristic is that humans 
tend to automatically impose explanatory narratives on any phenomenon they 
come across, regardless of how random and inexplicable it is in actuality.152 
The future is the ultimate unknown which the human brain feels compelled to 
tame. This need for certainty in the face of uncertainty is what gives rise to 
teleological ideas such as progress, because ideas like this allow their 
adherents to believe that at least the unpredictability of the future will play out 
predictably. As Karl Popper wrote, concluding his critique of historicism: 
It almost looks as if [these fatalists] were trying to compensate themselves 
for the loss of an unchanging world by clinging to the faith that change can 
be foreseen because it is ruled by an unchanging law.153 
Thus believing that history is rational may just be a way that human brains 
relieve their anxiety through the pretence that all the uncertainty embodied by 
the future is ultimately subject to something certain — if you are an optimist, 
something like progress. 
IV IF EQUALITY IS NOT INEVITABLE, WHERE TO FROM 
HERE? 
Thus far we have established that none of the reasons why people make 
statements of inevitability provide a solid foundation for believing their 
conclusions of inevitability. Rhetorical statements are based on loose logic, 
causal reasoning can get us safely only so far into the future and any 
teleological account of history is more likely than not a ruse. In the words of 
political theorist Wendy Brown: 
We are confronted [then] with the fact of history –– and so also with 
political futures and actions that would produce and configure them –– as a 
sheer problem of power. This is what is brought into view at the moment 
that historical metanarratives are fully exposed as fictions.154 
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When confronted with this destabilisation of the narrative of inevitability, 
what avenues are open to campaigners, pop culture generators and academics 
acting as lesbian and gay law reform activists? There are at least three. 
The first is to despair and become lost in the grip of a ‘paralyzing 
disorientation’.155 For if we lose the promise of a better future –– with no 
surefooted ideology or narrative to replace it –– what reason is there to fight 
the good fight? On what do we pin our hopes? Even if activists do manage to 
continue their struggle, how are they to orient themselves without constants 
such as ‘progress’? They will be forced to locate their law reform efforts 
within a history that lacks ‘a landmark or a point of reference’.156 It is 
submitted that heightened anxiety about the future and the prospects of 
gaining equality is a good thing. When all bets are off and no result is 
preordained, there is greater incentive to exert the energy needed to effect 
social and legal change. The fact that the activist can no longer cling to the 
certainty of progress may at first be dizzying, but in the wake of deconstructed 
metanarratives we must all learn to ‘pursue political justice within a world 
that is contingent, unpredictable, not fully knowable, and directed neither by 
external forces nor by internal logics’.157 Giving up on progress can also be 
empowering in the sense of freeing activists from delusions and revealing to 
them the actual dynamics of power at play behind the discourse of 
inevitability. 
This brings us to the second option available to gay law reform activists. With 
the benefit of this revelation about the hegemony of progress, they may 
choose to continue to exploit the discourse of inevitability, knowing all the 
while that it is a fiction. Essentially, if they persist with inevitability, they 
must do so for the cynical reason already explored above; that is, as a 
rhetorical device in an attempt to engineer truth through a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that lesbian and gay people will one day be equal. Given that 
humans tend naturally to think of history in teleological terms, it may be 
strategic to appropriate the progressive destination towards which it is said we 
are headed and to prescribe it as one of equality between the sexualities. 
There are, however, various shortcomings to this totalising strategy, not the 
least of them being that the strategy is disingenuous and takes people for 
fools. For one thing, if the strategy succeeds and people do believe that 
equality is inevitable, then all except those in the know are liable to become 
complacent. Why work hard for equality when it is guaranteed, and if we ever 
do attain it, why guard it vigilantly when it is irreversible? For another thing, 
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in pretending that the discourses of inevitability and progress remain intact, 
this cynical strategy cannot simultaneously undermine them through self-
criticism and self-reflection. It cannot ask what the effect is of the narrative of 
progress or how invocations of inevitability work to marginalise certain 
subjects and experiences. Moreover, because such a strategy is wedded to the 
idea of a single predestined future, it cannot deign to imagine competing 
futures and the limitless political possibilities that lie within them. By far the 
biggest drawback to the strategy is that there is no assurance it will work. Its 
success depends on lesbian and gay rights activists being able to ingrain the 
eventual achievement of equality as a self-evident given. In Foucauldian 
terms, this involves formulating knowledge, which requires power (though 
knowledge and power have a symbiotic relationship). The problem is that the 
power behind the ability of equality activists to formulate truth is not static. 
There are competing discourses on sexuality circulating in society that could 
begin to gain the upper hand and infiltrate knowledge structures at any 
moment. There is no guarantee, therefore, that power will not shift to other 
segments of society, as we are currently witnessing in Russia, for example. In 
the context of a lurch to conservatism in Russia,158 it would hardly be 
surprising to find that lesbian and gay rights activists there lack the power to 
engender a widespread belief that their equality is inevitable. At the very least, 
lesbian and gay rights activists should be wary of putting all their eggs in this 
basket. 
The last option for lesbian and gay law reform activists is to move outside the 
framework of progress, or, as Brown puts it, to engage in a politics ‘out of 
history’.159 As to what this post-progressivist politics might look like, ideally 
it should be characterised by a wild imagination as well as a deep suspicion of 
the present in order to release the present’s hold over the future. Once equality 
activists appreciate that there is an infinite number of possible futures, they 
need to draw upon all their creativity to imagine what these futures may be. 
They need to conjure up utopias to provide the goals for their activism, but 
they also need to envisage dystopian futures so that they can be prepared for 
less than ideal eventualities. As Popper might have said, equality advocates 
need to dare to imagine the conditions under which progress will be 
arrested.160 As for fomenting a deep suspicion of the present, Brown 
advocates taking up a ‘genealogical politics’ based on the concept of 
‘genealogy’ as formulated by Nietzsche161 and adapted by Foucault.162 For 
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Brown, we must call into question everything we think we know, and 
especially purported truths, in order to discover that ‘the present [is only] the 
accidental production of the contingent past’.163 What we currently know as 
‘progress’, ‘equality’, ‘rights’ and ‘sexuality’, for example, are all constructs 
of history and are thus open to being rendered mutable. When we discover, as 
Nietzsche did, that the present may be ‘living at the expense of the future’,164 
we become capable of intervening and reshaping history (rather than being, as 
Hegel insisted, the mere tools of history165). Thus genealogy opens up ‘faults, 
fractures, and fissures’166 in the present, through which various futures might 
be pursued. 
More specifically, it is to be hoped that a lesbian and gay activism ‘out of 
history’ would be as obsessed as Foucault was with discontinuities. 
Genealogy –– as a way of viewing history that highlights discontinuity –– can 
help shine a spotlight on countertrends away from equality and the possibility 
that formal equality is reversible. As we have seen, the assumption of 
inevitability tends to conceal the experience of growing inequality in one way 
or another. Tactical statements of inevitability deny the existence of 
countertrends, causation-based statements ignore them as irrelevant, and 
teleological statements trivialise them as the quaint preludes to progress as 
usual. Yet there are alarming trends both domestically and internationally that 
are not being given airspace in this discourse of inevitability. For example, the 
Queensland government has recently shown that symbolic equality gains can 
be reversed. However, rather than learning from this setback by identifying 
what made equality susceptible and how it might be made resilient, the 
discourse of inevitability has relegated the Queensland example to the status 
of an embarrassing anomaly that will soon be set right in the march of 
progress. It may be that depriving countertrends of oxygen is the key to 
inevitability creating its own reality. It may also be that ignoring 
countertrends leaves us unprepared for the future. Instead of marginalising 
these experiences, a lesbian and gay activism ‘out of history’ might draw 
attention to them, both to combat them in the present and to study their causes 
for posterity. If lesbian and gay people ever do achieve an equal status under 
the law, post-progressivists would be mindful that there is no ‘end of history’, 
only ceaseless unpredictable change which may include the undoing of 
equality in a post-equal world. By highlighting instances of regression and 
making a science out of the resilience or reversibility of equality, activism 
                                                                                                                    
162 Foucault, above n 142. 
163 Brown, above n 154, 103. 
164 Nietzsche, above n 161, 20. 
165 Hegel, above n 106, 20–6, 32–3. 
166 Brown, above n 154, 103. 
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‘out of history’ can help us to acquire the tools we need to face these darker 
days. 
V CONCLUSION 
There is a mounting sense in Australian society –– if not the entire Western 
world –– that equality for lesbian and gay people is inevitable, and this 
assumption is so insidious that it is creeping into what is accepted as truth 
without challenge. There are a number of overlapping reasons why people 
might declare that equality is bound to be attained. In a political struggle over 
the distribution of rights in society, rhetoric and rational arguments with 
different bases tend to get mixed up. In teasing them out this article has 
delineated three possible reasons why the language of inevitability is being 
employed. First, those who espouse inevitability may simply be 
propagandising the issue of inequality. On a superficial level, it seems that the 
authors of these sound-bite slogans are not overly concerned with whether or 
not inevitability is true. On a deeper analysis, taking into account the 
relationship between power and knowledge, it seems that they are in fact 
attempting to engineer truth through self-fulfilling prophecies in order to win 
the debate. Second, these fatalists may be resigned to inevitability because 
they see a chain of causation leading to equality at some point in the future. 
One can make relatively safe predictions that certain causes we can detect 
now will have certain effects in the very near future, but formal equality for 
lesbian and gay people is unlikely to be achieved any time soon, certainly not 
so soon that we can be sure it will be the direct effect of any currently existing 
cause. There might be several more links in the chain between now and then, 
and the more links involved, the more opportunities there are for unforeseen 
causes to intervene and take history in some other direction. For this reason, 
any causation theory which culminates optimistically in equality is more 
likely a thinly veiled teleology theory. Teleology –– the third possible 
motivation for statements of inevitability –– is premised on a belief that 
history is progressing towards some ultimate end, in this case freedom or 
equality. The idea that history is being guided by a purpose in turn requires a 
more fundamental belief that history is rational in the sense that everything 
happens for a reason and nothing by chance. Perhaps these fatalists believe 
history behaves rationally in this way because they cannot contemplate the 
alternative: that the future is unknowable. 
While each of these reasons provides some insight into underlying motives, 
none provides a solid basis for concluding that equality between the 
sexualities is in fact inevitable. Rhetorical statements are based on loose logic, 
causal reasoning tries to build a bridge too far and teleological reasoning is a 
baseless evolutionary trick our brains play on us. How then are gay law 
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reform activists to face this reality that equality is not inevitable? With the 
comfort of a certain future ripped from under their feet, they may turn to 
despair, or they may become even more cynical and exploit the discourse of 
inevitability. Each of these options has its weaknesses. Being overwhelmed 
will not bring equality any closer and persisting with the language of 
inevitability may breed complacency. Worse still, clinging to inevitability 
rhetoric betrays ‘a poverty of imagination’, which leaves its adherents 
unprepared for regression.167 More practically, the strategy of continuing to 
invoke inevitability might not pay off if knowledge and power structures shift 
in an unfavourable direction. A more radical and transformative option open 
to equality activists is to move outside the framework of progress altogether. 
To do so they would need to cultivate active imaginations about the very best 
and very worst the future might bring so that they have goals in the wake of 
progress’s demise, yet remain prepared. To assist in imagining alternative 
futures they may profit from engaging in a ‘genealogical politics’ that 
unsettles the settled present so as to lessen the weight of history on current 
realities and therefore future possibilities. Just one political possibility this 
may open up is a focus upon countertrends away from equality as a site of 
investigation and struggle for law reform. In sum, there is no positive basis for 
believing that formal equality for lesbian and gay people is inevitable, nor that 
it is irreversible. More likely, it is something we need to work hard for and to 
guard anxiously if we ever do attain it. 
                                                 
167 Popper, above n 52, 130. 
